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The Fiduciary Responsibilities of a Surviving
Partner Acting as Executor of the Deceased
Partner's Estate
I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Partnership Act provides that although the death
of any partner effects a dissolution of the partnership,' the partner-
ship continues until the surviving partner winds up the affairs of the
partnership.2 Generally, upon the death of a partner, a partnership
either liquidates,' continues with the consent of the representative
of the deceased partner,4 continues without the consent of the de-
ceased partner's representative, 5 or follows the terms of a partner-
ship agreement.' The surviving partner plays a major role in each
of those situations.
The relationship of a partner to his copartners or of a surviving
partner to a deceased partner's legal representative is that of a
fiduciary, with the duty to "render on demand true and full infor-
mation of all things affecting the partnership."7 The issue of fidu-
ciary responsibility, however, is more complicated when a surviving
partner who wishes to continue the partnership is also the executor
of the deceased partner's estate. An executor/surviving partner 8
must consider whether his right to decide among several alternative
courses of action is one that belongs to an executor or to a surviving
partner; this classificiation will determine the fiduciary standard
applicable.
This Note examines the nature of the fiduciary duty in the
situation in which an executor/surviving partner must decide
whether to consent to a continuation of thepartnership business
1. Uniform Partnership Act § 29 defines dissolution as "the change in the relation of
the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distin-
guished from the winding up of the business." See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31(4).
2. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr §§ 30, 21(2).
3. Uniform Partnership Act § 40 provides the rules for distribution of the partnership's
assets.
4. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 41(3).
5. The Uniform Partnership Act fails to expressly provide for the continuation of a
partnership without the consent of the deceased partner's representative. Most courts treat
this situation as identical to one in which the representative gives his consent to continue.
See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
6. Uniform Partnership Act § 42 grants the deceased partner's estate certain rights
when the partnership business is continued "unless otherwise agreed" in a partnership agree-
ment. See notes 81-99 infra and accompanying text.
7. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 20.
8. The term "executor/surviving partner" is used to refer to a surviving partner who was
appointed executor of the deceased partner's estate.
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after dissolution and in the situation in which the surviving partner
has an option to purchase the deceased partner's interest in the
partnership under the terms of a partnership agreement. After sepa-
rately considering the nature of the fiduciary duties of an executor
and a surviving partner, the Note discusses the degree to which the
fiduciary loyalty that an executor/surviving partner owes the de-
ceased partner's estate governs his decision on whether to continue
the partnership business after dissolution or to exercise an option
to purchase.
II. FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF AN EXECUTOR
An executor is similar to a trustee in that "the executor is a
fiduciary who holds the title to property for the benefit of others."'
An executor occupies a position of trust with regard to those with
pecuniary interests in the estate. Nevertheless, an executorship dif-
fers from a trusteeship in several respects. As an officer of the pro-
bate court, the executor has an obligation to that court. Further-
more, the function of an executor is the temporary one of collecting
the testator's personal property, converting the property to money
as necessary, and paying taxes, expenses, legatees, and creditors of
the testator.'
When examining the fiduciary responsibilities of an executor,
however, the fiduciary obligations of a trustee provide the appropri-
ate judicial standard. At least to the extent that an executor is one
in whom power affecting property is vested for the benefit of an-
other, the executor is a trustee and is held to the fiduciary stan-
dard."' Thus, as to matters within the scope of the trust relationship,
an executor must act for the benefit of the other.'2
Several courts have attempted to limit the situations in which
an executor's personal interest may conflict with those of the estate.
In In re Anderson's Estate'3 the court held that "[a]n administrator
should not be placed in a position in which he is torn between a legal
duty to protect the estate and a natural desire to advance his own
interests."" Similarly, the court in Ringer v. Lockhart'5 concluded
9. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF LAW OF TRUSTS § 15 (5th ed. 1973).
10. Id.
11. In re Estate of Cross, 51 Cal. App. 3d 80, 123 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1975); In re Estate of
Scheibe, 30 Wis. 2d 116, 140 N.W.2d 196 (1966); McKeigue v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 130 Wis.
543, 546, 110 N.W. 384, 385 (1907).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959).
13. 168 Kan. 299, 212 P.2d 375 (1949).
14. Id. at 301, 212 P.2d at 378. See Price's Adm'r v. Price, 291 Ky. 211, 163 S.W.2d 463
(1942).
15. 240 Ga. 82, 239 S.E.2d 349 (1977).
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that the executor must resign if the executor's personal interests
might conflict with those of the beneficiary.
6
Other courts, however, have held that an individual with poten-
tially conflicting interests may serve as executor on the assumption
that the testator knew of the conflict when he appointed the execu-
tor. 7 In addition, the executor may proceed with a questionably
adverse transaction if he has prior authority from the court 8 or the
permission of the devisees. 9 The transaction will still be voidable,
however, if either the executor fails to disclose material facts, the
transaction is unfair or unreasonable, or the executor exerted his
influence to gain the consent. 2" Moreover, a court may remove an
executor for misconduct.
The conflict between an executor's personal interest and his
fiduciary duty becomes acute when the executor wishes to buy the
deceased's property. At common law, a sale by an executor to him-
self is voidable on a showing of good cause by one having a pecuniary
interest in the estate. 2' This rule is inapplicable, however, if the
deceased's will, the applicable statute, or the court authorizes the
purchase22 and if the sale is fairly made.2 3 In addition, when the
executor has a personal interest in the property, he will be allowed
to buy property only to protect his interest and only for a fair price.
24
A major concern of the courts when the executor purchases the
estate's property is the fairness of the purchase price. The fiduciary
standard often employed is whether the executor exercised "such
care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in
16. Id. at 85, 239 S.E.2d at 351. The court quoted with approval from George G. Bogert:
It is generally, if not always, humanly impossible for the same person to act fairly
in two capacities and on behalf of two interests in the same transaction. Consciously or
unconsciously he will favor one side as against the other, where there is or may be a
conflict of interest. If one of the interests involved is that of the trustee personally,
selfishness is apt to lead him to give himself an advantage.
G.G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543 (2d ed. 1960).
17. In re Foss' Will, 282 A.D. 509, 513, 125 N.Y.S.2d 105, 108 (1953).
18. In re Tannenbaum's Will, 30 Misc. 2d 743, 219 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sur. Ct. 1961).
19. Klein v. Acco Prod. Inc., 79 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1935).
20. 2 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170 (2d ed. 1956).
21. Toedter v. Bradshaw, 164 Cal. App. 2d 200, 330 P.2d 688 (1958); King v. King, 225
Ga. 142, 166 S.E.2d 347 (1969) (common law rule applied to executor's sale of estate's prop-
erty to his wife).
22. Walters v. Wannemacher, 6 Ohio App. 2d 226, 217 N.E.2d 695 (1964).
23. Harlan v. Lee, 174 Md. 579, 199 A. 862 (1938); In re Frolich Estate, 112 N.H. 320,
295 A.2d 448 (1972) (express language in will altering fiduciary duty); O'Hayer v. de St.
Aubin, 30 A.D.2d 419, 293 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1968) (express language in will altering fiduciary
duty).
24. Adler v. Adler, 87 Ga. App. 842, 75 S.E.2d 578 (1953); Talbert v. Reeves, 211 Md.
275, 127 A.2d 533 (1956); Morehead v. Harris, 262 N.C. 330, 137 S.E.2d 174 (1964).
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dealing with his own property." 2 The executor must demonstrate a
good faith effort to locate potential purchasers and to determine the
fair market value of the property or to allow competitive bidding.'6
Even a good faith effort is insufficient, however, to sustain a sale if
the executor failed to act in the best interests of the estate. In In re
Tannenbaum's Will 27 a coexecutor purchased the stock of a com-
pany operated by the testator and herself and continued the busi-
iess. 21 The executor failed to include a charge for goodwill and to
search for other purchasers. 2 The court held that:
[Wlhen certain actions would be for the best interests of the estate, but
possibly involve personal gain or technical conflict of interest, the fiduciary
must not proceed without prior authority from the court upon a proper show-
ing. Good faith will not absolve him from the consequences of a violation of
his duty, and any doubt will be resolved against him."
Thus, the safest course for an executor to pursue when he wishes to
purchase estate property is to secure either the court's approval of
the purchase or the consent of interested parties.
When faced with several courses of action in the administration
of an estate, the executor's fiduciary obligations of loyalty and rea-
sonable care require him to select the option most beneficial to the
estate. In In re Bush's Will" the testator's will allowed the executor
to distribute at his own discretion certain stocks and bonds between
himself and his son.32 Despite the language granting the executor
broad discretion, the court held that the executor must make the
distribution equitably and fairly between himself and his son.33 Sim-
ilarly, in Matter of Estate of Rothko34 the testator had entered a
contract to sell his paintings at only a ten percent commission to
an art gallery with which one of the executors, Reis, was asso-
ciated.35 The court initially held that Reis' association with the gal-
lery prevented him from impartially deciding whether the agree-
25. In re Estate of Scheibe, 30 Wis. 2d 116, 119, 140 N.W.2d 196, 198 (1966). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
26. Landis v. First Nat'l Bank, 20 Cal. App. 2d 198, 66 P.2d 730 (1937).
27. 30 Misc. 2d 743, 219 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1961).
28. Id. at 746, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
29. Id. at 748, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
30. Id. at 747, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
31. 2 A.D.2d 526, 156 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1956).
32. Id. at 527, 156 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
33. Id. at 529, 156 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
34. 84 Misc. 2d 830, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1975), modified, 56 A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d
870 (1977), aff'd on rehearing, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977).
35. 84 Misc. 2d at 838, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 935. The executor, Bernard J. Reis, was director,
secretary, and treasurer of Marlborough Gallery, Inc. The court found that a second executor,
Theodoros Stamos, had a personal interest in enhancing his artistic career. Several months
after the estate contracts were signed, Stamos entered a favorable contract with Marlborough.
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ment survived the testator's death. 6 The executors chose, however,
to enter a new contract with the gallery. The court found the con-
tract to be unfair and invalid because Reis had committed a breach
of trust.37 Reis' duty as an executor was to obtain the most advanta-
geous terms for the estate while his duty to the art gallery was to
bargain in opposition .3 The court concluded that a fiduciary with
conflicting interests must resign or obtain the court's direction be-
fore he enters a questionable transaction .3
The executor who manages an estate in which he has a conflict-
ing interest is in a delicate situation. He must not only act in good
faith in furtherance of the estate's interest but he must also uphold
the estate's interests over his own. Although a surviving partner
exercises a lesser degree of control over the property of his deceased
partner than does the executor, the surviving partner also owes
certain fiduciary obligations to the estate.
M. FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILmIES OF A SURVIVING PARTNER
A. Winding Up and Terminating the Partnership
The common law treated a partner as a trustee over his copart-
ner's interest in the partnership." Sections 20 and 21 of the Uniform
Partnership Act codify the common law in so far as it regards a
partner as a fiduciary." The court in Helmore v. Smith 2 captured
the essence of the fiduciary relationship between partners:
If the fiduciary relation means anything I cannot conceive a stronger case
of fiduciary relation than that which exists between partners. Their mutual
confidence is the life blood of the concern. It is because they trust one another
36. Id. at 846, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
37. Id. at 858, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
38. Id. at 838-39, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
39. Id. at 838, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
40. Yeomans v. Lysfjord, 162 Cal. App. 2d 357, 327 P.2d 957 (1958); Brown v. Leach,
189 A.D. 158, 178 N.Y.S. 319 (1919), appeal dismissed, 228 N.Y. 612, 127 N.E. 909 (1920);
Note, Fiduciary Duties of Partners, 48 IowA L. REv. 902 (1963).
41. Uniform Partnership Act § 20 provides:
Partners shall render on demand true and full information of all things affecting the
partnership to any partner or the legal representative of any deceased partner or partner
under legal disability.
Uniform Partnership Act § 21 provides:
(1) Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as
trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners from
any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership
or from any use by him of its property.
(2) This section applies also to the representatives of a deceased partner engaged
in the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership as the personal representatives of the
last surviving partner.
42. 35 Del. Ch. 436 (1887).
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that they are partners in the first instance; it is because they continue to trust
one another that business goes on. 3
This fiduciary relationship between partners survives the death of
a partner; the surviving partner also owes a fiduciary duty to his
deceased partner's representative. Under section 43 of the Uniform
Partnership Act, 4 the surviving partner has a duty to account to the
deceased partner's estate, and the deceased partner's representative
can, upon cause shown, obtain a winding up of the partnership
business .4 5
The sole right of the deceased partner's representative with
regard to the partnership is to call upon the surviving partner to
account for the assets of the partnership.46 The surviving partner has
the burden of proof to show that he employed the highest degree of
correctness and fairness in the charges and claims made." In an
action for an accounting, a court of equity will grant relief to a party
who suffered a breach of obligation. For example, when one partner
negotiates a contract prior to dissolution, the contract belongs to the
partnership.48 Moreover, if a surviving partner continues the part-
nership business after dissolution, without either an accounting and
winding up or the consent of the deceased partner's representative,
then the deceased partner's estate is entitled to receive either the
value of the deceased partner's interest in the partnership at the
date of dissolution with interest or the profits attributable to the use
of his rights in the property of the dissolved partnership." An ac-
counting is governed, however, by any applicable terms of the part-
nership agreement, including, for example, a formula for determin-
ing the value of a partnership interest 0 In the absence of an agree-
43. Id. at 444.
44. Uniform Partnership Act § 43 provides:
The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner, or his
legal representative, as against the winding up partners or the surviving partners
of the person or partnership continuing the business, at the date of dissolution,
in the absence of any agreement to the contrary.
45. Uniform Partnership Act § 37 provides:
Unless otherwise agreed the partners who have not wrongfully dissolved the
partnership or the legal representative of the last surviving partner, not bank-
rupt, has the right to wind up the partnership affairs; provided, however, that
any partner, his legal representative or his assignee, upon cause shown, may
obtain winding up by the court.
46. United States v. Wood, 8 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Pa. 1934), aff'd, 79 F.2d 286 (3d Cir.
1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 643 (1935).
47. Stephens v. Stephens, 298 Ky. 638, 183 S.W.2d 822 (1944). See Lee v. Dahlin, 399
Pa. 50, 159 A.2d 679 (1960).
48. Bracht v. Connell, 313 Pa. 397, 170 A. 297 (1933).
49. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 42; Cahill v. Haff, 248 N.Y. 377, 162 N.E. 288 (1928).
50. Epperson v. Rosemond, 100 Cal. App. 2d 344, 223 P.2d 655 (1950); Keller v. Keller,
4 Ill. App. 3d 89, 280 N.E.2d 281 (1972).
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ment for continuation, an accounting precedes the winding up of the
partnerhip business.
Because the Uniform Partnership Act fails to define "winding
up," there is some confusion on whether winding up includes liqui-
dation. At common law, upon the death of a partner, title to part-
nership property vested in the surviving partner who thereupon be-
came a trustee in equity for all interested parties with the duty to
wind up and account for the decedent's interest.5' In order to termi-
nate the partnership business, the surviving partner had to liqui-
date the partnership assets to insure payment of creditors' claims
and to determine the value of the partnership assets.52 In an action
for an accounting, the court in King v. Leighton 3 noted that "it is
the duty of the surviving . . . members to take possession of the
firm assets and perform its contracts, extinguish its liabilities and
close up its business in the manner most advantageous to the inter-
ests of all the parties concerned."" The surviving partner could
continue to administer the partnership affairs only if he acted hon-
estly and with due diligence. 5
In their treatise on the law of partnership, Professors Crane and
Bromberg conclude that the Uniform Partnership Act codifies the
common law view of winding up as including liquidation of assets.
Thus, they define winding up as the reduction of assets to cash to
pay creditors and to distribute to partners the value of their respec-
tive interests.57 The Uniform Partnership Act also codifies the com-
mon law view that the surviving partner has a fiduciary duty to the
deceased partner's estate. As trustee of the deceased partner's as-
sets, his responsibility is to settle the partnership's affairs, to pay
any debts, and to turn over to the executor the deceased partner's
share. 9 Because the surviving partner usually has superior knowl-
edge of the business, courts are flexible in applying the fiduciary
standard to a surviving partner. Thus, the surviving partner's re-
sponsibility may vary according to the knowledge and experience of
51. Gurley v. Gurley, 77 Miss. 413, 26 So. 962 (1900).
52. See 62 MICH. L. REv. 106 (1963).
53. 100 N.Y. 386, 3 N.E. 594 (1885).
54. Id. at 393, 3 N.E. at 598.
55. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 80 (1968). Contra, 62 MICH. L. REv.
106 (1963). The author argues that winding up is a term of art "encompassing the process of
'liquidation' yet not necessarily requiring a liquidation sale in every instance." Id. at 108.
56. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERO, supra note 55, at § 80; see note 45 supra.
57. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 55, at § 80.
58. Cotton v. Stevens, 79 N.H. 224, 107 A. 602 (1919); Meyer v. Meyer, 201 A.D. 596,
194 N.Y.S. 718 (1922); Sharp v. Sharp, 54 Utah 262, 180 P. 580 (1919).
59. Grigg v. Hanna, 283 Mich. 443, 278 N.W. 125 (1938).
1980]
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the person with whom he deals. 0
The surviving partner also has a duty to represent accurately
and to disclose any material facts. These responsibilities are partic-
ularly important when the surviving partner wishes to purchase the
deceased partner's partnership interest. At common law the de-
ceased partner's representative and the surviving partner could
agree on the division of the property in kind or on the specific
purchase price of the deceased partner's interest. In the absence of
such an agreement, the surviving partner and the deceased part-
ner's representative would liquidate the partnership assets and di-
vide the proceeds according to each partner's interest." In the ab-
sence of a breach of fiduciary responsibility, courts have generally
upheld the right of a surviving partner to purchase the deceased
partner's interest at a fair and reasonable price when the deceased
partner's representative agreed to the sale."2 Final approval of the
sale, however, rests on the court's determination that the deceased
partner's representative recognized the value of the partnership in-
terest and represented the interests of the estate or that the interests
of the estate were otherwise represented.13
Under the fiduciary duty of loyalty, the surviving partner must
disclose all facts that relate to the valuation of the interest being
acquired."4 The court in Grigg v. Hanna"5 noted that "a fraud arising
from the suppression of the truth is as prejudicial as that which
springs from the assertion of a falsehood and courts have not hesi-
tated to sustain recoveries where the truth has been suppressed with
the intent to defraud."" If the surviving partner can reasonably
assume that the deceased partner's representative has knowledge of
60. Reed v. Robilio, 273 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Tenn. 1967), affl'd, 400 F.2d 730 (6th Cir.
1968).
61. See Brombert, Partnership Dissolution-Causes, Consequences and Cures, 43 TEX.
L. REv. 631, 649 (1965); Ludlam, Dissolution of Partnership by Death, 23 Miss. L.J. 117, 118
(1952).
62. Malden Trust Co. v. Brooks, 291 Mass. 273, 290, 197 N.E. 100, 106 (1935); Denholm
v. McKay, 148 Mass. 434, 19 N.E. 551 (1889). See generally Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v.
Dickson, 78 Mich. App. 12, 259 N.W.2d 228 (1977) (Uniform Partnership Act provides a right
to wind up, not to buy, the partnership).
63. James v. Wade, 200 Ark. 786, 141 S.W.2d 13 (1940) (a surviving partner may
purchase partnership property when the sale is under the direction of a court of equity and
there is no rule preventing the surviving partner from becoming a purchaser); Cummings v.
Russell, 258 Mass. 502, 508, 155 N.E. 641, 643 (1927). See note 62 supra.
64. Note, Fiduciary Duties of Partners, 48 IowA L. REV. 902 (1963). See Estate of Witlin,
83 Cal. App. 3d 167, 147 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1978); Penner v. DeNike, 288 Mich. 488, 285 N.W.
33 (1939); Rogers v. Stacy, 63 N.M. 317, 318 P.2d 1116 (1957); Johnson v. Buck, 540 S.W.2d
393 (Tex. 1976).
65. 283 Mich. 443, 278 N.W. 125 (1938).
66. Id. at 460, 278 N.W. at 132.
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a material fact, however, then his silence is not a breach of good
faith." Thus, the general rule on the surviving partner's scope of
disclosure is that if the transaction "is fair and open and no advan-
tage is taken, it will be upheld."6
The partnership relationship is a material fact that the surviv-
ing partner must disclose. In Johnston v. Kitchin" the court initially
approved the sale of the deceased partner's partnership interest, but
the purchaser failed to disclose to either the administrator or the
court that he was a surviving partner. As a result, the court held
that the surviving partner had the burden to show that the transac-
tion was fair and was entered into by the seller with full knowledge
of the facts.70 The court reasoned that because the surviving partner
occupied a position of advantage, the court would have approved
the purchase only after a careful inquiry into the partnership's af-
fairs and scrutiny of the transaction."
Thus, the surviving partner engaged in winding up a partner-
ship has a fiduciary responsibility to render an accurate accounting
of the partnership's affairs and to represent fairly and to disclose
material facts to the executor and the court. Winding up and termi-
nating the partnership, however, is only one alternative that the
Uniform Partnership Act provides a surviving partner. Another al-
ternative is the continuation of the partnership by the surviving
partner.
B. Continuing the Partnership Business
Section 41(3) of the Uniform Partnership Act gives the executor
of a deceased partner's estate the power .to consent to the continua-
tion of the partnership business." Section 42 provides that, when
the partnership is continued with the executor's consent and with-
out any settlement of accounts between the estate and the person
or partnership continuing the business,
unless otherwise agreed ... [the] legal representative as against such per-
sons or partnership may have the value of his interest at the date of dissolution
ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal to the
value of his interest in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, at the option
67. Reed v. Robilio, 273 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Tenn. 1967), affl'd, 400 F.2d 730 (6th Cir.
1968).
68. Coates v. Lunt, 210 Mass. 314, 318, 96 N.E. 685, 687 (1911).
69. 259 P. 102 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1927), rev'd on other grounds, 203 Cal. 766, 265 P.
941 (1928). The California Supreme Court reversed the district court decision because the
defendant and the deceased were tenants in common and not partners.
70. Id. at 105.
71. Id.
72. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 41(3).
19801
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of his legal representative, in lieu of interest, the profits attributable to the use
of his right in the property of the dissolved partnership.3
Thus, while the executor may initially elect to allow the partnership
business to continue, he may subsequently elect to withdraw the
deceased partner's interest from the partnership. The executor then
has the option to receive either the value of the deceased partner's
interest in the partnership at the date of the deceased partner's
death with interest or the profits derived from the use of the de-
ceased partner's right in the property of the dissolved partnership.74
Moreover, the majority of courts hold that section 42 gives the exec-
utor an option to receive profits or interest even if the surviving
partner continues the business unnecessarily and without the con-
sent of the executor.75
The right of election under section 42 essentially embodies the
common law71 fiduciary duty of a continuing surviving partner to
render a fair accounting of the partnership affairs. When a surviving
partner continues the partnership business and commingles the
partnership funds with his own funds, the entire fund is liable for
any loss. 77 If the business is operated only in order to wind up the
partnership business by liquidating the assets over a period of time,
however, then the business is not continued within the meaning of
section 42 and the representative does not have a right of election.',
In addition, when the partners' main contributions to the partner-
ship business are personal skill and time, the courts hold that the
deceased partner's estate may not participate in post-dissolution
profits. 7 The surviving partner will not breach his fiduciary duty to
the deceased partner's estate because he will earn the profits
through his own skill and time and not through partnership prop-
erty.
Section 42 also provides for the continuation of the partnership
73. Id. § 42.
74. The option to receive either the value of the deceased partner's interest in the
partnership at the date of the deceased's death with interest or the profits derived from the
use of the deceased's right in the partnership property will hereinafter be referred to as "the
right of election." The deceased partner's interest in the partnership at the date of his death
with interest will hereinafter be referred to as the right to "interest." The deceased partner's
interest in the profits derived from the use of his right in the property of the dissolved
partnership will hereinafter be referred to as the right to "profits."
75. Cauble v. Handler, 503 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1973). See notes 100-03 infra and accom-
panying text.
76. Ruppe v. Utter, 76 Cal. App. 19, 243 P. 715 (1925); In re Maloney's Estate, 233 Pa.
614, 82 A. 958 (1912).
77. Froess v. Froess, 289 Pa. 69, 137 A. 124 (1927).
78. Hurley v. Hurley, 33 Del. Ch. 231, 91 A.2d 674 (1952).
79. Blut v. Katz, 13 N.J. 374, 99 A.2d 785 (1953).
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business with the consent of the deceased partner's representative
"unless otherwise agreed." Thus, when the partners have provided
in a partnership agreement for the continuation of the partnership,
the executor's consent is immaterial; the rights of the surviving
partner will be governed by the terms of the partnership agree-
ment.8 0
C. Exercising the Option to Purchase under the Partnership
Agreement
The general view is that a partnership agreement is a contract,,'
the terms of which courts will enforce between the partners even if
the result appears inequitable.8 2 Indeed, courts repeatedly have de-
nied that partnership agreements which dispose of a partner's inter-
est on death are testamentary.83 Rather, courts have upheld partner-
ship agreements, reasoning that the agreement was drafted by those
who are most familiar with the character and value of the property. 4
Nevertheless, contracts are subject to interpretation. Thus, in
construing partnership agreements, courts will consider the inten-
tion and the objectives of the parties.85 The past conduct of the
partners is one indication of their interpretation of the partnership
agreement and may effectively amend the agreement. 8 Thus, if the
partners habitually ignored a certain provision in their partnership
agreement, the courts will refuse to uphold this provision when one
partner seeks to enforce it.87 Moreover, if a partnership continues
beyond the expiration of the written partnership agreement and if
the partners' actions indicate implied consent to continue the part-
nership under the terms of the written agreement, then the court
will enforce the agreement's terms.88 In addition, the Uniform Part-
80. See Forster, Legal, Tax And Practical Problems Under Partnership Purchase And
Sale Agreements Coupled With Life Insurance, 19 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1945); Fuller,
Partnership Agreements For Continuation Of An Enterprise After The Death Of A Partner,
50 YALE L.J. 202 (1940); Note, Partnership Continuation Agreements, 72 HA~v. L. REV. 1302
(1959).
81. Harris v. Klure, 205 Cal. App. 2d 574, 23 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1962); Balian v. Rainey,
115 Cal. App. 2d 10, 251 P.2d 731 (1952); Park Cities Corp. v. Byrd, 534 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.
1976).
82. Morgan v. Balzhiser, 279 Or. 343, 568 P.2d 1354 (1977).
83. Silverthorne v. Mayo, 238 N.C. 274, 77 S.E.2d 678 (1953).
84. In re Karlinski's Estate, 180 Misc. 44, 38 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1942), rev'd on other
grounds, 180 Misc. 44, 43 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1943).
85. Harris v. Klure, 205 Cal. App. 2d 574, 23 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1962).
86. In re Dunham's Will, 52 Misc. 2d 364, 276 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1966).
87. Battista v. Carlo, 57 Misc. 2d 495, 293 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1968). See Balian v. Rainey,
115 Cal. App. 2d 10, 251 P.2d 731 (1952).
88. See Wagner v. Etoll, 46 A.D.2d 990, 362 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1974).
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nership Act applies to any matter on which the partnership agree-
ment is silent." Thus, although courts uphold partnership agree-
ments, those courts often refuse to find themselves bound by the
terms of the agreement.
When the surviving partner is granted an option to buy the
deceased partner's interest under the partnership agreement, the
surviving partner is subject to the fiduciary standard imposed by
the Uniform Partnership Act. Although he is free to exercise the
option to buy, the surviving partner, as a fiduciary, must deal fairly
with the executor and the beneficiaries of the estate." The surviving
partner must disclose material facts, especially facts that relate to
the value of the partnership interest, so that the transaction be-
tween the surviving partner and the executor will be fair and open."
The courts assume that a partnership agreement contemplates fair
dealings between the partners, and construe any ambiguity in the
agreement in favor of the deceased partner's estate." In addition,
the executor is also a fiduciary, but with limited authority 3 because
the estate is bound by the partnership agreement, and the executor
therefore must sell the deceased partner's share if the surviving
partner exercises his option to buy"4 within a reasonable period of
time. 5
The surviving partner with an option to purchase has also been
characterized as a quasi-trustee. In Murphy v. Murphy" the court
reasoned that the surviving partner succeeded as legal owner of the
partnership's property, but that he took the property "subject to
the duty to pay the firm debts, settle the partnership accounts, and
89. Gardiner v. Gaither, 162 Cal. App. 2d 607, 329 P.2d 22 (1958); District of Columbia
v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 335 A.2d 238 (D.C. 1975); In re Dunham's Will, 52 Misc. 2d 364, 276
N.Y.S.2d 132 (1966); Adams v. Jarvis, 23 Wis. 2d 453, 127 N.W.2d 400 (1964). Contra, Tate
v. Hoover, 345 Pa. 19, 26 A.2d 665, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 677 (1942) (the terms of the
agreement of continuation control the rights of subsequent creditors; third parties must
inquire as to the contents of the agreement or extend credit at their own risk).
90. Spencer v. Spencer, 91 Idaho 880, 434 P.2d 98 (1967); Malden Trust Co. v. Brooks,
291 Mass. 273, 281, 197 N.E. 100, 106 (1935).
91. 291 Mass. at 282, 197 N.E. at 104. See Reed v. Robilio, 273 F. Supp. 954 (W.D.
Tenn. 1967), affl'd, 400 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1968) (surviving partner's fiduciary duty may be
breached by silence as well as by misrepresentation and concealment); Malden Trust Co. v.
Brooks, 276 Mass. 464, 177 N.E. 629 (1931).
92. Curtis v. Campbell, 336 S.W.2d 355, 359-60 (Ky. 1960).
93. Malden Trust Co. v. Brooks, 291 Mass. 273, 286, 197 N.E. 100, 108 (1935).
94. Id. at 287, 197 N.E. at 108.
95. In re Streck's Estate, 35 Ill. App. 2d 473, 183 N.E.2d 26 (1962) (surviving partner
accountable for profits earned, through the use of partnership property, subsequent to de-
ceased partner's death and prior to the exercise of his option to purchase); Altschuler v.
Altschuler, 410 Ill. 169, 101 N.E.2d 552 (1951); Hagan v. Dundore, 185 Md. 86, 43 A.2d 181
(1945).
96. 217 Mabs. 233, 104 N.E. 466 (1914).
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account to the personal representative of the deceased partner." 7
Thus, the surviving partner holds the property partly for the benefit
of the deceased partner's estate.
While the courts have termed both surviving partners and exec-
utors as trustees, a surviving partner's fiduciary obligations to his
deceased partner's estate are narrower than those of the executor.
The fiduciary qualities of loyalty and fair dealing are applicable to
both a surviving partner and an executor. The courts do not suggest,
however, that a surviving partner must act solely in the interests of
the estate.' A surviving partner who wishes to exercise the purchase
option granted him under the partnership agreement may do so
without considering the effect his actions will have on the estate.
Similarly, a surviving partner may continue the partnership busi-
ness with the consent of the deceased's representative without con-
sidering the interests of the estate. When a surviving partner also
serves as executor of the deceased partner's estate, however, his
fiduciary obligation may conflict with his personal interests. When
confronted with this situation, courts have attempted to separate
the rights and duties of a surviving partner from those of an executor
and apply the standards of fiduciary responsibility accordingly.
IV. FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF A SURVMNG PARTNER/EXECUTOR
A. Continuing the Partnership Business
Section 42 of the Uniform Partnership Act provides certain
safeguards against self-dealing and conflicts of interest to protect
the deceased partner's interest in partnership business. The surviv-
ing partner must wind up the partnership upon its dissolution un-
less the deceased partner's representative consents to the continua-
tion of the partnership business. Moreover, upon continuation, the
representative can elect to receive either the value of the deceased
partner's interest in the partnership at dissolution with interest or
the profits attributable to the use of the deceased partner's right in
the property of the dissolved partnership. The theory behind grant-
ing the representative this election is that the interests of the estate
should be recognized and protected when the partnership business
is continued utilizing the deceased partner's interest. The represent-
ative can investigate the financial solvency of the partnership before
he consents to the continuation of the partnership business. When
the surviving partner is also the executor of the deceased partner's
estate, however, the safeguards imposed by section 42 are of lesser
97. Id. at 236, 104 N.E. at 468.
98. Malden Trust Co. v. Brooks, 291 Mass. 273, 286, 197 N.E. 100, 110 (1935).
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value because the executor has only to consent to himself as the
surviving partner.
The ability of an executor/surviving partner to consent to the
continuation of the partnership business depends upon the court's
construction of the consent requirement. Most courts interpret sec-
tion 42 as embodying the common law principle that an executor
may elect to receive profits or interest regardless of whether the
partnership is continued with his consent." In Blumer Brewing
Corp. v. Mayer'" an administrator/surviving partner,'0' who contin-
ued the partnership after the death of his partner, credited the
estate with the profits and charged the estate with the losses of the
business. The court considered whether the administrator/surviving
partner had the power to consent to leaving the deceased partner's
interest in the partnership business.' 2 The court concluded that
when the administrator/surviving partner has the power to sell the
personal estate of the deceased partner without a court order, he
also has the power to consent to the continuation of the partnership
under section 42.13 Even when an executor lacks the power to sell
the deceased partner's personal estate, the court's holding would
probably be the same. In the interest of allowing the estate of a
deceased partner fair compensation for the deceased partner's part-
nership interest, the courts place little significance on. the presence
or absence of the executor's consent.
.It is significant, however, whether the executor/surviving part-
ner continued the partnership business within the meaning of sec-
tion 42 since some continuations of partnership business are inde-
pendent of section 42. In McGee v. Russell's Executors'4 the de-
ceased partner's will required the liquidation and distribution of the
99. See Froess v. Froess, 284 Pa. 369, 131 A. 276 (1925); Underdown v. Underdown, 279
Pa. 482, 124 A. 159 (1924); Cauble v. Handler, 503 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1973). Contra, Blut v.
Katz, 13 N.J. 374, 99 A.2d 785 (1953). The Blut court concluded that the Uniform Partnership
Act requires the deceased partner's representative to consent to the continuation of the
partnership business before he can exercise the option to receive profits. The administrator
was allowed to recover only the deceased partner's interest in the partnership at the date of
dissolution. Legal commentaries on the holding in Blut, however, have been critical. Note,
Profit Right And Creditors' Priorities After A Partner's Death Or Retirement: Section 42 of
the U.P.A., 63 YAE L.J. 709 (1954); 38 MINN. L. REv. 553 (1954).
100. 223 Wis. 540, 269 N.W. 693 (1936).
101. An administrator differs from an executor only in that an administrator is ap-
pointed by the court while an executor is named in the deceased's will. Since the fiduciary
duties of an administrator and an executor are virtually identical, their powers are also
similar. It is arguable, in fact, that an executor possesses even broader powers than does an
administrator because the deceased selected the surviving partner as executor of his will.
102. 269 N.W. at 694.
103. Id. at 696.
104. 150 Va. 155, 142 S.E. 524 (1928).
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testator's estate. The court held section 42 inapplicable because the
executor/surviving partner continued the partnership business only
for the purpose of utilizing the remaining assets and winding up the
business.' 5 As long as the executor/surviving partner liquidates the
partnership business within a reasonable length of time, sections 30
and 33 of the Uniform Partnership Act allow the continuation of the
partnership business. If the partnership business continues for an
unreasonable length of time, however, section 42 requires the execu-
tor/surviving partner to pay the deceased partner's devisees either
interest or profits.' ° Thus, section 42 deals with partnerships that
are continued for the purpose of winding up the businesses and
utilizing the partnership assets rather than for the purpose of profit
making.
The executor/survi-Ving partner's right to consent to the contin-
uation of the partnership business, however, has certain limitations.
The executor/surviving partner must terminate the partnership
business when the deceased partner's will requires liquidation of the
partnership."'7 Furthermore, the executor/surviving partner cannot
enter an agreement to forego the election between profits or interest
allowed under section 42. For example, the court in McDonald v.
McDonald'" held that an executor/surviving partner must make a
choice to pay the estate either the value of the deceased partner's
interest or profits because the purpose of the election is to allow the
executor to choose the option that "will most benefit the estate
during the period when the partnership is being wound up after
dissolution and before termination."'10
Another exception to the executor/surviving partner's right to
consent to the continuation of the partnership business arises when
the deceased partner's heirs and devisees oppose continuation and
the evidence suggests that the election to continue would not benefit
105. Id. at 163, 142 S.E. at 527.
106. In the case of In Streck's Estate, 35 Ill. App. 2d 473, 183 N.E.2d 26 (1962), the
surviving partners used the deceased partner's share of the partnership property until they
exercised the option granted them under the partnership agreement to purchase the deceased
partner's interest in the partnership. The court charged the surviving partner with the profits
attributable to the use of a deceased partner's right in the partnership property.
107. But see Klein v. Acco Prod. Inc., 79 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1935). The deceased partner
bequeathed his undivided half interest in the partnership to three of his children. The execu-
tor/surviving partner continued the business, however, rather than exercising his option under
the partnership agreement to purchase the decedent's interest. Since the legatees had agreed
with the executor/surviving partner that the business should be continued, the court held that
the continuation agreement was valid because all interested parties had joined in the agree-
ment.
108. 68 Wis. 2d 292, 228 N.W.2d 727 (1975).
109. Id. at 308, 228 N.W.2d at 736.
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the estate. In Gianakos v. Magiros"° plaintiff brought an action for
an accounting against the executor/surviving partner challenging
the latter's right of election.' The court held that the execu-
tor/surviving partner, absent a breach of his fiduciary duty, has the
right to continue the business without liquidation and that this
right of election is inherent in a surviving partner's position as exec-
utor, subject only to his duties as a fiduciary.12 Conversely, if the
exercise of the executor/surviving partner's power to consent or to
elect interest or profits would profit the executor/surviving partner
at the expense of the deceased partner's estate, the execu-
tor/surviving partner could not take this course of action."3 Thus,
the court, citing authority on the fiduciary obligations of an admin-
istrator or an executor rather than that of a partner, emphasized
that an executor/surviving partner must exercise his powers of elec-
tion in a manner that will benefit the deceased partner's estate.
The standards that must govern an executor/surviving part-
ner's decision whether to continue a partnership are the fiduciary
obligations of an executor. An executor confronted with several
courses of action must choose the one that is, in his judgment, most
beneficial to the estate. This decision is especially important when
one course of action would benefit the executor. In view of the con-
trol that an executor/surviving partner exerts over the estate, his
accounting of the deceased partner's interest or share of the profits
is subject to the strictest judicial review. The court in In re Eddy's
Estate"' held that because a surviving partner serving as executor
"has had absolute control over the assets of the estate and has had
unlimited opportunity to manage such assets in his uncontrolled
discretion it is appropriate that he be required to disclose in the
greatest detail all of his acts in his respective fiduciary capacities
"115
While section 42 of the Uniform Partnership Act gives an execu-
tor/surviving partner the right to continue a partnership business,
the fiduciary obligations of an- executor provide the restraints netes-
sary to protect the interests of the deceased partner's estate. The
situation in which a surviving partner acts as executor of his de-
ceased partner's estate is not provided for under the Uniform Part-
110. 238 Md. 178, 208 A.2d 718 (1965).
111. The appellant argued that general equitable principles precluded the execu-
tor/surviving partner from taking any action in which the beneficiaries' interests and his own
personal interests as surviving partner may conflict. Id. at 185, 208 A.2d at 722.
112. Id. at 184, 186, 208 A.2d at 721, 723.
113. Id. at 186, 208 A.2d at 723.
114. 175 Misc. 193, 22 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1940).
115. Id. at 194, 22 N.Y.S.2 d at 963.
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nership Act. Section 5 of the Uniform Partnership Act allows that
in cases not provided for under the Uniform Partnership Act, the
rules of law and equity govern."' If the executor/surviving partner
makes the election that is less beneficial to the deceased partner's
estate, then the law of fiduciary responsibility must be imposed to
reverse the election choice. Similarly, an executor/surviving part-
ner's interest may conflict with those of the estate when he exercises
an option to purchase the deceased partner's interest in the partner-
ship.
B. Exercising the Option to Purchase under the Partnership
Agreement
A partnership agreement may grant the surviving partner an
option to purchase the deceased partner's interest in the partner-
ship. As executor of the deceased partner's estate, the execu-
tor/surviving partner is aware of the economic consequences of such
a purchase on the deceased partner's estate. As a result, the execu-
tor/surviving partner often finds himself torn between a desire to
serve his own interests and a recognition of his fiduciary responsibil-
ities to the estate. Exercise of the option to purchase the deceased
partner's interest may be the most beneficial alternative for the
estate. If, however, the purchase is also detrimental to the economic
well-being of the partnership or surviving partner, the execu-
tor/surviving partner nevertheless may be tempted to decline to
exercise the option. Instead, the executor/surviving partner might
exercise his section 42 powers to consent to the continuation of the
partnership, and thereby subject the deceased partner's interest in
the partnership to the dangers of economic ruin." 7 The option to
purchase is a contract right that the surviving partner is entitled to
exercise unless an overriding fiduciary obligation precludes such
action.
Thus, the issue is whether the executor/surviving partner with
an option to purchase his deceased partner's interest has a fiduciary
obligation to consider the impact of his decisions on the estate and
to act to further the interests of the estate. In this regard, it is often
impossible to discern the testator's intent when the partnership
116. Uniform Partnership Act § 5 provides: In any case not provided for in this act the
rules of law and equity, including the law merchant, shall govern.
117. Uniform Partnership Act § 41(8) provides that creditors of the dissolved partner-
ship have a prior right to any claim of the representative of the deceased partner against the
person or partnership continuing the business, on account of "the deceased partner's interest
in the dissolved partnership or on account of any consideration promised for such interest or
for his right in partnership property."
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agreement grants the surviving partner the option to purchase the
testator's partnership interest and the testator's will appoints the
surviving partner as executor of his will. It is possible that the agree-
ment grants the surviving partner the option to purchase uncondi-
tionally. ' '8 It is also possible, however, that the testator intends that
the executor/surviving partner remain free to exercise the option
unless a reasonably prudent executor would recognize that exer-
cise of the option would harm the deceased partner's estate. The
dilemma is a problem of economic priorities and the executor/
surviving partner is not in a position to be objective.
The common law recognized the conflicting interests inherent
in the surviving partner's position as executor of the deceased part-
ner's estate. In the leading case of Case v. Abeel'l9 the court held
that equity considers the surviving partner a trustee of the partner-
ship property.'20 As such, he cannot make a valid agreement to
purchase or to take the property without accounting for any prof-
its.121 Furthermore, an executor/surviving partner cannot personally
realize profit or gain through the use of the partnership's funds.
Even when the partnership contract authorizes the executor to
make an agreement with the surviving partner on the purchase price
of the deceased partner's interest, courts hold an executor/surviving
partner unable to value properly the assets for sale to himself.'2 A
court may, however, allow a master to determine the fair purchase
price of the assets for the executor/surviving partner.1rs Moreover,
if the testator's beneficiaries consent to a purchase by the surviving
partner, the court may uphold the sale. Thus, in In re Mamaux's
118. In In re Mulholland's Will Trusts, [1949] 1 All E.R. 460, an English court held
that an option to purchase land was unconditionally given to a fiduciary. The testator had
granted a bank an option to purchase certain land after his death. He thereafter made a will
appointing the bank as coexecutor. The court held that the bank was not precluded by its
fiduciary position as executor from exercising the option because the bank had acquired the
option before it became a fiduciary. The language of the decision limited the decision consid-
erably:
I do not attempt to state any proposition which will necessarily apply to every type
of option. I am dealing in the present case with an option to purchase land and I confine
myself to that type of option. It must be remembered that an option as this confers an
immediate equitable interest in the land which is the subject of the option. . . and that
equitable interest is one which is capable of being registered under the Land Changes
Act, 1925, s. 10, class C, sub-para. (iv) ....
Id. at 464.
119. 1 Paige Ch. 393 (N.Y. 1829).
120. Id. at 397-98.
121. Id. See Colgate's Ex'r v. Colgate, 23 N.J. Eq. 372 (1873); In re Silkman, 121 App.
Div. 202, 105 N.Y.S. 872 (1907).
122. Denholm v. McKay, 148 Mass. 434, 440, 19 N.E. 551, 552 (1889).
123. See id. at 444, 19 N.E. at 554.
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Estate,'4 although the testator's will gave the two surviving part-
ners an option to purchase the deceased partner's interest in the
partnership, the court declared the exercise of this option voidable
because the testator's beneficiaries failed to consent to the arrange-
ment and because the executor was also one of the surviving part-
ners.'
The courts have recognized, however, that the rights and duties
of a surviving partner are separable from those of an executor. At
the death of a partner, his right in the partnership property vests
in the surviving partner.' 6 The surviving partner has the right to
wind up the partnership business under section 37 of the Uniform
Partnership Act.' 7 The surviving partner may also have an option
to purchase the deceased partner's interest under the terms of the
partnership agreement.'1 In Keyes v. Hurlbert,'29 the partnership
agreement gave the two surviving partners the option to purchase
the deceased partner's partnership interest at the property's official
appraised value. The court held that although an executor/surviving
partner cannot make a purchase agreement between himself as the
surviving partner and executor, he can carry out a provision in the
partnership agreement for the purchase of the deceased partner's
share at a prescribed valuation. 3 ' Thus, while at common law a sale
to an executor/surviving partner is voidable, under Keyes, a sale to
an executor/surviving partner is voidable only if the prescribed val-
uation method is violated or if the sale price is unfair. In sum, the
Keyes court subjects the executor/surviving partner only to the fidu-
ciary reponsibility of a surviving partner and disregards the second
fiduciary relationship that binds the executor/surviving partner to
the estate.
The central issue thus is whether any restraints are imposed on
the executor/surviving partner's purchase option, that is, whether
consideration of its effect on the deceased partner's estate qualifies
the right to exercise or to refrain from exercising the option to pur-
chase. In In re Estate of Van Epps'3 ' a partnership agreement gave
124. 274 Pa. 533, 118 A. 441 (1922).
125. Id. at 538, 118 A. at 443.
126. In Ellis v. Ellis, 415 Pa. 412, 203 A.2d 547 (1964), the court upheld the right of
coexecutors/surviving partners to purchase partnership assets under the supervision of the
common pleas court.
127. See note 45 supra.
128. See notes 81-99 supra and accompanying text.
129. 43 Cal. App. 2d 497, 111 P.2d 447 (1941).
130. If the valuation method is not prescribed in the agreement, then the burden is on
the executor/surviving partner to show that the sale price is fair. Id. at 501-02, 111 P.2d at
450.
131. 40 Wis. 2d 139, 161 N.W.2d 278 (1968).
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the surviving partner the option to purchase the deceased partner's
interest. 32 The deceased partner's will appointed a bank and the
surviving partner as coexecutors and expressly requested that the
surviving partner forego the exercise of the option unless it would
benefit the beneficiary of his will. 33 The court accepted the deceased
partner's request in his will as a limitation on the surviving part-
ner's right to exercise an option to purchase. 34 The decision indi-
cates, however, that this limitation is merely an expression of the
implied fiduciary duty that any executor owes the estate. The exec-
utor/surviving partner acts as trustee over the estate and has a duty
to "act in the interests of the beneficiaries at all times with respect
to the property in the estate. ' 13 The executor/surviving partner's
duties as executor are superior to his individual rights under the
contract.3 16 The Van Epps court failed to separate the rights and
duties of a surviving partner from those of an executor. Rather, the
court viewed the executor/surviving partner as subject to the execu-
tor's duty to act in the interest of the beneficiary with respect to the
estate's interest in the partnership. Yet, the court overlooked the
fact that partnership property will not vest in the estate until after
the surviving partner winds up the partnership business. Conse-
quently, the other courts have not applied the Van Epps decision
to imply that an executor/surviving partner has a duty to act with
reference to the interest of the beneficiary.
The Van Epps court, like the Keyes court,'37 was also concerned
with the reasonableness of the purchase price. In Van Epps the
court found that the purchase price was lower than its fair market
value. The court partially distinguished Keyes on the basis that
Keyes involved a fair purchase price.' 38 The reasonableness of the
purchase price is an important factor in the determination of
whether an executor/surviving partner breached his fiduciary duty
to the estate.
When the partnership agreement obligates the surviving part-
ner to exercise an bption to purchase the deceased partner's interest
at a specified price, the courts have upheld the purchase at the
named price. In Bloodworth v. Bloodworth'31 the partnership agree-
ment obligated the executor to convey the deceased partner's inter-
132. Id. at 141, 161 N.W.2d at 278-79.
133. Id. at 141, 161 N.W.2d at 279.
134. Id. at 142, 161 N.W.2d at 279.
135. Id. at 149, 161 N.W.2d at 282 (emphasis in original).
136. Id.
137. 43 Cal. App. 2d 497, 111 P.2d 447 (1941).
138. 40 Wis. 2d at 143, 161 N.W.2d at 280.
139. 224 Ga. 717, 164 S.E.2d 823 (1968).
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est in the partnership to the surviving partners for a specified con-
sideration. The deceased partner's will named two of the partners
as executors. The court upheld the conveyance of the deceased part-
ner's interest by the executor/surviving partners to themselves be-
cause the partnership agreement permitted neither variance nor
room for bargaining."'
The court's insistence on a fair purchase price is in essence the
fiduciary standard applied to a surviving partner who purchases a
deceased partner's interest."' The fairness of a purchase price is a
matter for judicial determination. Some states have attempted to
avoid self-dealing by fiduciaries by enacting statutes that prohibit
fiduciaries from purchasing property belonging to the trust or
estate.4 2 The court in Matter of Estate of Dillon,"' however, held
such statutes inapplicable to options to purchase that are granted
to the executor in buy-sell agreements. "' Conversely, the Van Epps
court held that the statute prohibited an executor/surviving partner
from exercising an option to purchase without the court's permis-
sion.' 4 Thus, the fairness of a purchase price may again become an
important issue when the executor/surviving partner seeks such
permission.
The most effective means of dealing with an alleged breach of
fiduciary responsibility is on a case-by-case basis. The surviving
partner has a contractual right to purchase the deceased partner's
interest in the partnership for a fair price. The purchase of the
deceased partner's share by the surviving partner is frequently in
the best interests of the estate. Furthermore, the surviving partner
is often a ready buyer and may be willing to pay a higher price for
the deceased partner's interest than a potential buyer who has no
140. Id. at 719, 164 S.E.2d at 825.
141. See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
142. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2222, 2230 (West 1954); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.155 (West Supp.
1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 555.201 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.85 (Callaghan 1974)); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 91-7-253 (1978 Supp.); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 86-302 to -303 (1947); N.Y.
EST., POWERS & TRUSTs LAW § 11-2.2 (Consol. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 59-01-10 to -01-11
(1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2109.43-.44 (Page 1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 496 (West
1965); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 55-2-2 to -2-3 (1967); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 352 (Vernon
1956); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.24.090 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 860.13 (West 1971); Wyo.
STAT. § 2-6-349 (1977).
143. 575 P.2d 127 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
144. Id. at 130. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 496 (1971) reads: [n]o executor or administrator
must directly or indirectly purchase any property of the estate he represents, nor must he be
interested in any sale.
145. 40 Wis. 2d 139, 161 N.W.2d 278 (1968). Wis. STAT. § 313.093 (1969), restated in
Wis. STAT. § 860.13 (1971), provides that no executor directly or indirectly may purchase




prior interest in the partnership. Finally, prior judicial approval of
a sale after a hearing at which interested parties can oppose the sale
is adequate to protect the interests of the estate.
V. CONCLUSION
The appointment of a surviving partner as executor of his co-
partner's will is a practice that is likely to continue. The partnership
is a popular form of conducting business, especially for family busi-
nesses, and it is only natural for an individual to appoint a family
member or trusted business partner as the executor of his estate.
Thus, it is important that the courts clearly define the fiduciary
obligations of an executor/surviving partner.
The fiduciary responsibilities of an executor/surviving partner
are strengthened by the fact that two fiduciary relationships bind
him to the estate. An executor/surviving partner has broader duties
and thus a higher level of fiduciary responsibility than does a mere
surviving partner. Nevertheless, conflicting interests are often una-
voidable when an executor/surviving partner faces certain decisions
with regard to the continuation of the partnership business or the
exercise of an option to purchase the deceased partner's interest.
Certain guidelines must be formulated to protect the interests
of the estate and to acquaint the executor/surviving partner with the
required standard of conduct. First, when an executor/surviving
partner has the right to select one of several alternatives in dealing
with the deceased partner's interest in the partnership, the execu-
tor/surviving partner must decide whether the right that he is exer-
cising belongs to an executor or to a surviving partner. If the right
is that of an executor, then the executor/surviving partner must act
as would a reasonably prudent executor who has a reasonably pru-
dent surviving partner's knowledge and understanding of the cir-
cumstances. He must pursue the course of action that will most
benefit the estate. If the right is an option granted a surviving part-
ner under the terms of a partnership agreement, however, then the
fiduciary standard is that of a surviving partner to deal fairly and
honestly with the estate. In this regard, the fairness of the purchase
price is an important determinant of whether a transaction is equi-
table. Second, before entering into any transaction on behalf of the
estate that could possibly involve a conflict of interest, the execu-
tor/surviving partner should both obtain the court's permission and
notify interested parties of the proceedings to assure them of an
opportunity to be heard. 4 ' Third, in reviewing the actions of the
146. See Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution-Causes, Consequences and Cures, 43
TEX. L. REv. 631, 649 (1965) (purchases by partners at a liquidation sale under court super-
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executor/surviving partner, a court should also determine whether
the executor/surviving partner was acting as an executor or as a
surviving partner. When reviewing the actions of an execu-
tor/surviving partner acting as an executor, the court should empha-
size the executor's duty to protect the interests of the decedent's
estate. When reviewing the actions of an executor/surviving partner
acting as a surviving partner, the court should place more emphasis
on the contractual obligations and rights of the parties. In the latter
situation, however, because one of the parties cannot adequately
represent himself, the court should also assure that those rights and
obligations are construed fairly by resolving any ambiguity in favor
of the deceased partner's estate.
SANDRA L. RANDLEMAN
vision are arguably allowable); 62 MIcH. L. Rav. 106 (1963) (court-sanctioned sale of the
deceased partner's interest is an alternative to liquidation).

